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over the last twenty years. This new form of IPO takes advantage of several
seemingly unrelated provisions of the tax code to multiply pre-IPO owners’
proceeds from a public offering without reducing the amount public
investors are willing to pay for the stock. Supercharged IPOs use a tax
receivable agreement to transfer tax assets created by the IPO back to the
pre-IPO ownership, “monetizing” the tax assets. As these structures have
become more efficient, commentators have expressed concerns that these
agreements deceive shareholders who either ignore or do not understand
the agreements’ implications. This Note argues that tax receivable
agreements are actually similar to other popular forms of monetizing tax
assets. Further, this Note shows that tax receivable agreements permit
parties to compensate each other for the value of tax assets, increase
efficiency in the market, and encourage risk-taking.
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INTRODUCTION
A new form of initial public offering (IPO) has quietly proliferated
over the last twenty years that can multiply pre-IPO owners’ proceeds from
the public offering by up to 20%.1 These transactions enable owners to
extract additional value from the IPO, without reducing the offering price,2
through the use of creative tax structuring. The pre-IPO owners
“supercharge” the IPO by contracting with the newly public entity to pass
back to the pre-IPO owners a portion of the tax benefits created by
structuring the IPO in specific ways—monetizing the tax assets created in
the IPO.3 These transactions are controversial in part because IPOs
traditionally do not have tax implications,4 and the tax benefits are created,
and transferred, in a convoluted manner. This Note will argue that many of
these concerns are exaggerated and the elements of the “supercharging”
transaction, which enable the monetization of the new tax benefits, are
actually not much different than other forms of uncontroversial
monetization.

1

Amy S. Elliott, IPO Agreements That Shift Basis Step-Up to Sellers Proliferate, 132 TAX NOTES
334, 334 (2011).
2
See Deborah L. Paul & Michael Sabbah, Understanding Tax Receivable Agreements, PRAC. L.J.:
TRANSACTIONS & BUS., June 2013, at 74; see also infra text accompanying note 246 (explaining that
public company valuations generally ignore tax attributes).
3
See Lynnley Browning, Squeezing out Cash Long After the I.P.O., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2013,
6:26 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/13/private-equity-squeezes-out-cash-long-after-itsexit/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/2BD3-C8HM]. See infra text accompanying notes 29–31 for an
explanation of how the tax benefits are monetized.
4
HOWARD E. ABRAMS ET AL., FEDERAL CORPORATE TAXATION 54 (7th ed. 2013); see infra text
accompanying notes 13–14.
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The first supercharged IPO occurred twenty-three years ago:5 Cooper
Industries, Inc. (Cooper) spun off its wire and cable manufacturing
subsidiary, Belden, Inc. (Belden), as a separate publicly traded company.6
Unlike traditional IPOs where the pre-IPO owners, Cooper in this case,
take their sale proceeds and move into line with other shareholders, Belden
and Cooper entered into a tax receivable agreement (TRA).7 Under the
basic terms of this agreement, Belden was obligated to pay Cooper 90% of
the tax benefits it received as a result of the IPO.8 These tax benefits were
tied to the amortization and depreciation9 of Belden’s assets, with a
possible payment schedule upwards of fifteen years.10 In short, Belden
became contractually bound to pay Cooper large sums of money annually
for a period of time that could significantly outlast Cooper’s ownership
stake in publicly traded Belden.
To better appreciate how TRAs affect the tax advantages of goingpublic transactions, it is useful to first understand the mechanics and the tax
implications of traditional IPOs. Assume that a corporation wishes to raise
capital by selling shares of stock to the public. The corporation will hire an
investment bank or an underwriter to market its stock.11 In return for the
stock, the corporation will receive cash from investors.12 Despite the

5

Thomas W. Avent, Jr. & John F. Simon, Making a Section 338(h)(10) Election on a Public
Offering, PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES, Aug. 2005, at 74, 84–85; Elliott, supra note 1, at 334. The term
“supercharged IPO” originated with Robert Willens, a corporate tax expert. Browning, supra note 3.
6
Avent & Simon, supra note 5, at 84–85.
7
Id. at 85. A TRA is an agreement between the new public company and the pre-IPO owners in
which the company is obligated to pay to the pre-IPO owners a predetermined percentage of the tax
savings or benefits created through the IPO. Browning, supra note 3.
8
Avent & Simon, supra note 5, at 85.
9
Depreciation and amortization are deductions that permit the recovery of the cost of property over
the property’s economic life. The idea is that the cost of using the asset during a particular year will
offset the income produced by that asset in that year, matching expenses with the corresponding
income. See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 182–83
(13th ed. 2015); RICHARD SCHMALBECK ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 593–94 (4th ed. 2015).
Tangible assets are “depreciated” over a specified period, whereas intangible assets, such as goodwill,
customer lists, and patents, are “amortized.” See I.R.C. §§ 167–168 (2012) (describing the depreciation
calculations); § 197 (describing the amortization calculations).
10
See Avent & Simon, supra note 5, at 86. The Belden IPO occurred following the enactment of
§ 197 of the Internal Revenue Code, which permits asset acquirers to utilize a fifteen-year amortization
period on acquired assets, meaning tax benefit payments stemming from amortization could last up to
fifteen years.
11
See PATRICK J. SCHULTHEIS ET AL., THE INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING: A GUIDEBOOK FOR
EXECUTIVES AND BOARDS OF DIRECTORS 1–2 (3d ed. 2008); Victor Fleischer & Nancy Staudt, The
Supercharged IPO, 67 VAND. L. REV. 307, 319 n.50 (2014).
12
See Fleischer & Staudt, supra note 11, at 317.
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exchange of large sums of money,13 a traditional IPO is effectively
disregarded for tax purposes.14 After all, an IPO is simply an exchange of
stock for cash: assets do not increase in value, services are not performed
by the corporation or the investor, and no productive activity occurs.15
While the corporation would not experience any tax effects, any pre-IPO
owners of the corporation who sold their stock in connection with the IPO
would likely experience capital gains and corresponding taxation of those
gains.16 After the IPO, there may be little in the way of ongoing
relationships between the pre-IPO owners and the newly public corporation
beyond the customary relationship enjoyed between shareholders and their
corporations.17
In contrast, the pre-IPO owners of a supercharged IPO maintain a
relationship with the company for up to fifteen years outside of the
customary shareholder–corporation relationship.18 This difference is the

13

According to SEC data, gross proceeds of IPOs in the United States totaled $74.4 billion in 2014.
David A. Westenberg, Practising Law Institute, Initial Public Offerings: A Practical Guide to Going
Public (Bloomberg) § 1.5 fig.1-4 (2d ed. 2015), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/5296709160
[https://perma.cc/Q98X-WZXG].
14
See § 1032(a) (“No gain or loss shall be recognized to a corporation on the receipt of money or
other property in exchange for stock . . . of such corporation.”). If the newly formed entity (Newco) is
acquiring the assets or stock of another entity as part of the IPO, the transaction is structured as tax free
under § 351. The transferors of the stock or assets defer gain recognition while Newco’s basis in the
assets will be carried over from the previous owners. Id. § 351; MARTIN D. GINSBURG ET AL.,
MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND BUYOUTS ¶ 405 (Mar. 2016 ed.).
15
ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 4, at 54 (7th ed. 2013).
16
See §§ 1(h), 61(a)(3), 1001(a). This Note analyzes tax issues surrounding the actual IPO itself
and the transfer of tax benefits from the newly public company to the pre-IPO owners. The taxation of
income resulting from the sale of stock or other property by the pre-IPO investors in the public market
is outside the scope of this Note.
17
This is somewhat of a simplification because there can be various ways for historical owners to
remain involved in the corporate entity. For example, pre-IPO owners, such as founders, may remain on
the board of directors or as employees of Newco. This raises the interesting question of whether these
individuals have conflicts of interest with respect to Newco if they remain involved as directors or
officers of Newco and are also parties to the TRA. This may raise fiduciary duty and business judgment
rule implications. For example, a director, who is also party to a TRA, may prefer raising capital
through equity rather than debt, since interest payments on debt are tax deductible, unlike equity
dividends, and could reduce payments under the TRA. As an example of this type of relationship where
the parties to the TRA were also key members of the management team, see Evercore Partners Inc.
(Evercore), an early Up-C transaction. See infra Section I.C for a discussion of Up-C transactions.
Evercore entered into a TRA with its senior managing directors, including Rodger Altman, who also
served as Evercore’s chairman and co-chief executive officer. Evercore Partners Inc., Amendment No.
4 to Form S-1 Registration Statement (Form S-1/A), at 6–7 (Aug. 9, 2006). However, in the simplest of
IPOs, nothing requires historical owners to remain involved in the corporation.
18
See Browning, supra note 3. Note that the original founders of the company may or may not still
be involved in the company. For the purpose of simplicity, this discussion assumes the founders are no
longer involved following the IPO, and the only relationships between the pre-IPO owners and the
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result of a TRA between the pre-IPO owners and the company, which splits
the value of the tax assets among the parties to the TRA.19 Often, these tax
assets are created through unique aspects of the IPO process itself.20 In a
standard supercharged IPO, the pre-IPO owners transfer their interests in an
operating company (Opco) to a newly formed entity (Newco).21 Opco
becomes a subsidiary of Newco.22 If properly structured, these transfers
boost the value of certain assets for tax purposes by increasing or creating
basis.23 Basis is generally equivalent to cost24 and is a concept used to track
value in order to prevent double taxation on the same amount.25 Basis is
adjusted downward as depreciation tax deductions are taken.26 Since a
higher basis means greater depreciation deductions, Newco pays less tax if
the basis in certain assets is increased.27 For example, in some instances
goodwill may be amortized over a period of fifteen years leading to fifteen
years of deductions (amortization of an intangible asset, like goodwill, is
functionally similar to depreciation of a tangible asset).28
Then, Newco agrees in a TRA to pay a percentage of the current and
future tax savings to the pre-IPO owners to supercharge the transaction.29
The newly public Newco keeps the remaining tax savings, giving Newco
the benefit of a portion of the deductions that were attributable to the
taxable transfers before the IPO.30 As a result, the pre-IPO owners receive a
stream of payments as amortization and depreciation deductions are taken
over time.31 These payments are often taxed at a capital gains tax rate,

company are from the TRA and the customary shareholder–corporation context. For an explanation of
the standard fifteen-year term of the TRA, see infra text accompanying notes 60–61.
19
Fleischer & Staudt, supra note 11, at 319. Tax assets are “tax deductions, credits, and
exemptions that generate tax savings for the company in the future.” Id. at 315.
20
Id. at 319–20; see also GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 14, ¶ 405 (describing a “busted” § 351
exchange as compared to a tax-free transaction).
21
Browning, supra note 3.
22
See id.
23
See infra Part I; Fleischer & Staudt, supra note 11, at 319 n.50. These assets include “tax credits,
operating losses, good will, amortization and property depreciation.” Browning, supra note 3. The
transfer increases the value of these items, but it is important to remember that tax value is different
than market value and these tax benefits may not be sold independently of the underlying assets.
24
I.R.C. § 1012(a) (2012).
25
SCHMALBECK ET AL., supra note 9, at 5–6.
26
See infra Section I.A; Fleischer & Staudt, supra note 11, at 319 n.50.
27
Fleischer & Staudt, supra note 11, at 319 n.50; Browning, supra note 3.
28
§ 197(a); Robert Willens, The Private Equity Version of the ‘Supercharged’ IPO is Nothing New,
116 TAX NOTES 601, 601 (2007).
29
Browning, supra note 3.
30
Id.
31
Id.
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which is lower than the rate for ordinary income.32 Essentially, as between
Newco and the pre-IPO owners, this is a means of saving money through
advantageous categorization of income.33 In other words, by structuring the
transaction to increase future amortization and depreciation deductions, the
IPO generates future tax savings for Newco. The TRA provides a
mechanism to pass a percentage of these savings to the pre-IPO owners.
Commentators and market participants describe these transactions as
finding the “pearl in the oyster” because the transactions generate or unlock
hidden tax assets (the amortization and depreciation tax deductions) and
convert them into cash.34 And while only approximately one in fifty IPOs
backed by private equity use this strategy,35 experts argue its use is
increasing.36 The transfer of these tax benefits presents interesting questions
surrounding the alienability of tax benefits. While the government
significantly restricts the transfer of tax assets in some situations, in others,
the government openly encourages such transfers, and, in cases where the
government encourages such transfers, the purchase and sale of tax assets
sometimes constitutes a significant component of corporate operating and
acquisition strategies.37
This presents the question of whether and how the government should
regulate supercharged IPOs that use TRAs to shift the savings associated
with certain tax benefits. Traditionally, companies felt “there was
something a little bit underhanded about [supercharged IPOs].”38 One

32

Id.; Elliott, supra note 1, at 334. But see Willens, supra note 28, at 603 n.9 (describing
circumstances where pre-IPO owners may not enjoy capital gain rates). The distinction between capital
gains and ordinary income rates is not important to the policy proposed by this Note. However, the tax
advantages presented by a supercharged IPO would be reduced to the extent pre-IPO owners are taxed
at a higher ordinary income rate.
33
Willens, supra note 28, at 603 n.9; supra note 32. The income is categorized as capital gains
income to the pre-IPO owners rather than ordinary income to Newco, which would be taxed at a higher
rate. See supra note 32. However, it is not clear that the owners will actually see the benefits
contemplated. See supra note 32..
34
Browning, supra note 3; see also Fleischer & Staudt, supra note 11, at 324 n.66.
35
Browning, supra note 3. For perspective, Ernst & Young estimates 120 private equity-backed
IPOs occurred in the first three quarters of 2015, collectively raising $38.5 billion. This number is down
from 163 private equity-backed IPOs raising $95.8 billion in 2014. Private Equity, Public Exits Q3
2015, ERNST & YOUNG (Mar. 21, 2016), http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Industries/Private-Equity/EYprivate-equity-public-exits-q3-2015 [https://perma.cc/B7QN-XQZ7].
36
Browning, supra note 3.
37
Compare leasing depreciable property, discussed in Section II.B.1, which is generally prohibited,
with tradeable tax credits, discussed in Section II.B.3, particularly the text accompanying note 231.
Some companies invest heavily in tradeable tax credits to minimize their tax liability or, in the case of
net operating losses, acquire other companies to access their tax assets. Net operating losses are
discussed in Section II.B.2.
38
Elliott, supra note 1, at 334 (quoting Robert Willens).
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commentator admits they “drain[] money out of . . . compan[ies] that could
be used for purposes that benefit all the shareholders.”39 Indeed, even
today, these structures have been sharply characterized as examples of
“opaque secretive financial engineering,”40 “gimmick[s],”41 and “obscure
dirty little secret[s].”42 Nonetheless, many in the mergers and acquisitions
industry view the agreements as exploiting inefficiencies that occur
because public stockholders do not fully understand, or value, tax
attributes.43 Tax expert Robert Willens argues that “a supercharged IPO is
not a tax gimmick but instead is a reflection of how an IPO is priced.”44
Regardless of one’s perspective as to the desirability of TRAs, it is clear
that they are becoming more common and that they will be increasingly
used “as a means for sellers to monetize the value of their business’ [sic]
tax attributes.”45
TRAs are not entirely unique. Other methods of monetizing tax
benefits exist or have been attempted. For example, in the 1980s, Congress
authorized the effective purchase and sale of tax deductions tied to the
depreciation of machinery and equipment through a statutory leasing
program.46 By taking advantage of a statutory safe harbor, a taxpayer
(Taxpayer One) could lease depreciable property to another taxpayer
(Taxpayer Two) for Taxpayer Two’s use, while Taxpayer One retained the
tax advantages stemming from depreciation deductions related to the
property.47 This program largely failed and was repealed shortly after
enactment.48 In contrast, the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) permits the

39

Browning, supra note 3 (quoting Robert Willens).
Matt Levine, Supercharged IPOs: Like Regular IPOs, but Slower, DEALBREAKER (Mar. 14,
2014, 4:53 PM), http://dealbreaker.com/2013/03/supercharged-ipos-like-regular-ipos-but-slower/
[https://perma.cc/G8XY-9DCP].
41
Yves Smith, Another Private Equity Scam – Tax Receivable Agreements, NAKED CAPITALISM
(Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2015/08/another-private-equity-scam-tax-receivableagreements.html [https://perma.cc/ZR8P-W2RT].
42
A Dirty Little Private Equity Secret: Tax Receivable Agreements, SEEKING ALPHA: COURAGE &
CONVICTION INVESTING (Oct. 15, 2015, 8:58 AM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/3574146-a-dirtylittle-private-equity-secret-tax-receivable-agreements [https://perma.cc/8GRG-YDKL].
43
Paul & Sabbah, supra note 2, at 74–75.
44
Willens, supra note 28, at 603.
45
Paul & Sabbah, supra note 2, at 79.
46
See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172; Alvin C. Warren, Jr.
& Alan J. Auerbach, Transferability of Tax Incentives and the Fiction of Safe Harbor Leasing,
95 HARV. L. REV. 1752, 1753 (1982); see also infra text accompanying notes 152–54 (explaining how
the law operated in more detail).
47
See DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, TAXES, SPENDING, AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S MARCH TOWARD
BANKRUPTCY 17–18 (2007); see also infra text accompanying notes 164–66.
48
SHAVIRO, supra note 47, at 18.
40
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partial monetization of net operating losses (NOLs).49 NOLs can be used by
taxpayers to offset future income against historical losses.50 This benefit
may be bought and sold in certain situations.51 Moreover, the I.R.C. goes so
far as to fully condone the direct buying and selling of certain tax credits,
such as the low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC).52 Indeed, the LIHTC
program would not work if the tax credits could not be monetized.53
This Note will demonstrate that popular concerns that TRAs deceive
public shareholders are overblown and, additionally, that TRAs reduce
inefficiencies produced by the tax system by allowing those who create
valuable tax assets to benefit from them. Part I will review the history of
supercharged IPOs, starting with the enactment of § 197(a) of the I.R.C.
and the Belden IPO. Part I will also demonstrate the increasing efficiency
with which these agreements transfer tax benefits and explain the
mechanics of a supercharged IPO from a tax standpoint. Part II will take a
step back from TRAs to examine general policies toward the monetization
of tax benefits, by (a) exploring different policies toward monetization and
identifying the normative justifications for such policies and (b) examining
the implementation of these policies through the current law applicable to
(1) “leasing” depreciable property; (2) selling net operating losses; and (3)
investing in certain types of tax credits. Part III will apply these policies to
TRAs in the context of supercharged IPOs. It will argue that TRAs share
the qualities of NOLs and investable tax credits that make both of these tax
benefits good candidates for monetization and that TRAs, as mechanisms
to monetize tax benefits, have little in common with failed monetization
efforts. In short, this Note establishes that supercharged IPOs and TRAs are
similar to other forms of tax benefit monetization and increase efficiency in
the market.
I.

HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF SUPERCHARGED IPOS

This Part will trace the evolution of supercharged IPOs and describe
the tax mechanisms that provide the supercharged value. There are three
varieties of IPO transactions that may be supercharged: (1) § 338(h)(10)
transactions; (2) publicly traded partnerships; and (3) Up-Cs.54 To be truly

49

I.R.C. § 172(a)–(c) (2012); see infra text accompanying note 198.
§ 172(a)–(b); see infra text accompanying note 199.
51
ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 4, at 347–48; see infra text accompanying notes 205–07.
52
Clinton G. Wallace, The Case for Tradable Tax Credits, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 227, 238–39
(2011).
53
Id. at 239; see infra text accompanying notes 232–33.
54
See John C. Hart, The Umbrellas of Subchapter K, SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP (Jan.
2016),
http://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-source/related-link-pdfs/umbrellas-of-subchapter-k.pdf?
50
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supercharged, each of these transactions uses a TRA to monetize tax
benefits, which are made available as a result of transactions that create
new tax assets.55
A.

Section 338(h)(10) Transactions

Section 338(h)(10) IPO transactions were the first supercharged
IPOs.56 If parties elect to conduct their transaction under § 338(h)(10), a
buyer records a stepped-up,57 or higher, basis in the corporation’s assets,
increasing the amount that can be depreciated and thus creating a tax
benefit.58 Although they would not become popular for over a decade,
supercharged IPOs were effectively enabled in 1993 by the enactment of
I.R.C. § 197(a).59 Section 197(a) permits a tax deduction for the straightline amortization60 of most acquired intangible assets over a fifteen-year
period, commencing when the assets are acquired.61 Requiring a minimum
amortization period for acquired intangibles encourages accountants to
more accurately value acquired intangibles so that cost recovery on the
intangibles through amortization is maximized.62
sfvrsn=6 [https://perma.cc/5C5H-K2JQ] (describing the evolution of transactions such as publicly
traded partnerships and Up-Cs and the use of TRAs in the IPO context). See generally Elliott, supra
note 1 (describing the evolution of supercharged transactions from § 338(h)(10) transactions, to the
publicly traded partnership form, to Up-Cs).
55
Fleischer & Staudt, supra note 11, at 319.
56
Gladriel Shobe, Supercharged IPOs, the Up-C, and Private Tax Benefits in Public Offerings,
U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 16), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2754376
[https://perma.cc/4DAR-CNJD]; see also Elliott, supra note 1, at 334 (tracking the development of
TRAs from § 338(h)(10) transactions to other types).
57
The stepped-up basis is an increase in the “basis” of an asset for tax purposes. Recall that an
asset’s basis is generally the cost of the asset. I.R.C. § 1012(a) (2012). Abrams et al. describe a § 338
transaction in which the basis of a corporation’s assets steps up, or increases, to the assets’ fair market
value as a result of an acquisition of those assets. See ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 4, at 234–35. Since
taxable gain is calculated as value less basis, a stepped-up basis will reduce the taxable gain, in turn
reducing the amount of tax payable.
58
Shobe, supra note 56, at 16–17.
59
Willens, supra note 28, at 601 (describing the consequences of enacting § 197); see § 197(a).
60
In other words, the deduction will be taken in equal amounts over a fixed period of time. In this
case, fifteen years. See CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 9, at 187–88 (describing the application of
the straight-line method).
61
Willens, supra note 28, at 601.
62
CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 9, at 203–04 (discussing the implications of § 197 on the
treatment of purchased intangibles). It is worth noting that because § 197(a) affects only intangible
assets acquired in a taxable purchase of assets, the section does not authorize amortization where assets
are acquired in a nontaxable acquisition in which acquired assets receive carryover basis. See
GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 14, ¶ 403.4.1.2; Willens, supra note 28, at 601. Ginsburg et al. point out
that § 197 applies to “(1) any [stepped-up basis] acquisition and (2) any [carryover basis] acquisition
with a separately purchased non-compete covenant.” GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 14, ¶ 403.4.1.2.
Category two is outside the scope of this Note. Therefore, for our purposes, § 197 affects “[i]ntangible
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The first supercharged IPO strategy to take advantage of § 197(a) used
a qualified stock purchase (QSP) to exploit the basis step-up available
under § 338(h)(10).63 Electing to conduct a stock purchase or sale under
this provision permits the purchase or sale to be deemed a purchase or sale
of assets for income tax purposes.64 Section 338(d)(3) defines a QSP as
“any transaction or series of transactions in which stock . . . of [one]
corporation is acquired by another corporation by purchase during [a] 12month acquisition period.”65 The purchaser must acquire “at least 80
percent of the total voting power of the stock” of the target and “at least 80
percent of the total value of the stock” of the target66 and must be a
corporation.67 Further, § 338(h)(3) defines “purchase” as any acquisition of
stock, subject to certain complex criteria.68
Corporate parents primarily use § 338(h)(10) to buy and sell target
subsidiaries.69 However, if a parent corporation wishes to sell a subsidiary
in the public market through an IPO, for example, a QSP can be used to set
up a § 338(h)(10) election, which results in a stepped-up basis70 in the

assets acquired in (1) a taxable purchase of assets . . . or (2) a taxable purchase of stock . . . with a Code
§ 338, § 338(h)(10), or § 336(e) election.” Id. The ability to amortize intangibles that do not fall within
the definition of a “section 197 intangible,” § 197(d)(1), is unclear. Robert Willens, General Electric
‘Supercharges’ the Genworth Financial IPO, 104 TAX NOTES 661, 663 n.4 (2004). Willens explains
that prior to the enactment of § 197, intangibles could be amortized only if they satisfied two criteria:
“[t]he asset had to be ‘separate and distinct’ from goodwill and useful to the business for only a limited
period the duration of which could be ascertained with ‘reasonable accuracy.’” Id.
63
Avent & Simon, supra note 5, at 84; Paul & Sabbah, supra note 2, at 76.
64
I.R.C. § 338(h)(10) (2012); Paul & Sabbah, supra note 2, at 76; see also Avent & Simon, supra
note 5, at 84 (describing the consequences of electing to conduct a stock purchase under § 338(h)(10)).
65
§ 338(d)(3).
66
Id. § 1504(a)(2); see Avent & Simon, supra note 5, at 75.
67
§ 338(d)(3). A partnership or individual can meet this requirement by forming a corporation to
purchase the target’s stock, but the corporation cannot “merg[e] downstream into target, liquidat[e], or
otherwise dispos[e] of the target stock following the purported” QSP. Treas. Reg. § 1.338-3(b)(1)
(2001); see Avent & Simon, supra note 5, at 75.
68
§ 338(h)(3); Willens, supra note 62, at 661. Section 338(h)(10) transactions are designed to meet
these three complex criteria. Because the transactions meet the criteria, they are referred to as “busted
351” transactions. Section 351 permits tax-free asset transfers from one corporation to another,
provided the first corporation is “in control” of the second. § 351(a). Control is defined in § 368(c) as
“the ownership of stock possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes
of stock entitled to vote and at least 80 percent of the total number of shares.” § 368(c). If a transaction
satisfies § 351, the transaction would not meet the criteria in § 338(h)(3) and no § 338(h)(10) election
for stepped-up basis would be available. However, by “busting 351,” a parent transferor and a
transferee can make a § 338(h)(10) election and treat the transfer as a taxable sale of assets and not a
sale of stock. To bust § 351, the parent usually sells a portion of their equity in the transferee to the
public through an IPO. Thus, the transferee becomes a public company. Paul & Sabbah, supra note 2, at
76.
69
Avent & Simon, supra note 5, at 74.
70
See supra note 57.
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subsidiary’s assets71 when combined with the public offering.72 The Belden
IPO described in the Introduction is one of the earliest examples of using a
§ 338(h)(10) election to pave the way for a TRA to supercharge its IPO.73
Thus, to restructure a QSP into a supercharged IPO, the pre-IPO
owner (the Parent, in the above scenario) must organize a new corporation
(Newco) and transfer to Newco the stock of the subsidiary (Target) that
will be sold in the public market.74 In exchange for contributing stock of
Target to Newco, Parent receives stock of Newco, plus additional
consideration, such as a note for future cash payments.75 Simultaneously,
Parent hires an underwriter and agrees to sell at least 80% of its Newco
stock to the underwriter.76 The underwriter, in turn, sells the stock to the
public.77 By transferring 80% of the Newco stock to an underwriter for
public sale, Parent ensures it will lack the 80% ownership requirement for
control under § 351, which otherwise could result in a tax-free exchange.78
By following the procedure above, Newco makes a QSP of Target under
§ 338. Finally, because Target is now part of Parent’s consolidated group
for tax purposes, Parent and Newco may make a § 338(h)(10) election,
giving Newco a stepped-up basis in the assets owned by Target.79 Since
§ 338(h)(10) applies, Newco’s purchase of Target is deemed an asset
purchase, and § 197(a) permits the amortization of intangibles.80 A TRA is
then used to share Newco’s new tax benefits with Parent.81
One historic example of a § 338(h)(10) transaction is General
Electric’s (GE) 2004 spin-off IPO of Genworth Financial, Inc.82 Genworth
obtained a new, stepped-up basis in the GE subsidiaries it acquired,
benefitting both GE and Genworth.83 First, Genworth was able to utilize
71

See Avent & Simon, supra note 5, at 74–75.
This “busts” § 351. See supra note 68.
73
See Elliott, supra note 1, at 334.
74
Avent & Simon, supra note 5, at 74–75.
75
Id. The note ensures that the transaction fails to meet the requirements of § 368(a)(1)(B) for a
tax-free reorganization. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B) (2012); Avent & Simon, supra note 5, at 89.
76
Avent & Simon, supra note 5, at 75.
77
Id.
78
Id. If the exchange is tax-free, then there will be no stepped-up basis and the IPO will not be
supercharged. See §§ 351(a), 368; see also supra note 14.
79
See § 338(h)(10); Avent & Simon, supra note 5, at 75; Willens, supra note 62, at 662.
80
§ 197(a); Avent & Simon, supra note 5, at 75; Paul & Sabbah, supra note 2, at 76; see text
accompanying notes 63–64.
81
Avent & Simon, supra note 5, at 84.
82
See Raymond Hennessey, Genworth Goes Public in Year’s Largest IPO, WALL ST. J. (May 26,
2004, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB108549812788820708 [https://perma.cc/47ZZ2YLH]; Willens, supra note 62, at 661.
83
Willens, supra note 62, at 662.
72
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§ 197, which allowed it to amortize the cost of acquired goodwill over
fifteen years.84 Second, a stepped-up basis in non-amortizable assets
reduced the taxable gain that Genworth reported when Genworth sold those
assets.85 Finally, Genworth experienced significant tax savings over time as
a result of the tax deductions associated with the amortization and steppedup basis.86 Of course, the TRA between Genworth and GE required that
Genworth pass back 80% of the tax savings resulting from its IPO.87
B.

Publicly Traded Partnerships

In the mid-2000s, investment partnerships, such as private equity
firms, began utilizing I.R.C. sections other than § 338(h)(10) to create tax
assets that could be combined with TRAs to supercharge the IPOs of their
publicly traded partnerships (PTPs).88 PTPs are taxed as corporations,
unless the partnership is eligible for a qualifying income exemption and is
not a regulated investment company.89 Under the qualifying income
exemption, a PTP is not subject to taxation as a corporation if 90% of its
gross income comes from sources such as interest, dividends, and gains
from the sale of certain assets.90
In the PTP structure, a publicly traded entity causes a subsidiary to
purchase interests in a private equity firm’s businesses through an
investment fund.91 The purchases entitle the subsidiary to a stepped-up
basis in the acquired assets.92 Thus, the purchasing subsidiaries also benefit
84
85
86

Id.
Id.
Id. (discussing amortization in the context of “antichurning,” which is beyond the scope of this

Note).
87

Id.; see Genworth Fin. Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 64 (Mar. 2, 2015) (describing the
present value of the TRA payments as $216 million as of December 31, 2014, with cumulative
payments capped at $640 million).
88
An early example, and likely the first instance of a supercharged publicly traded partnership, is
the IPO of investment bank, Lazard Ltd., in May 2005. Elliott, supra note 1, at 334.
89
I.R.C. § 7704(a), (c)–(d) (2012). Examples of publicly traded partnerships include Blackstone
Group, Carlyle Group LP, and KKR & Co.
90
See id. § 7704(c)(2), (d)(1). A regulated investment company is an investment fund that fits
certain criteria and does not need to pay federal income tax on shareholder distributions. The required
criteria are rather strict. See § 851; Joseph A. Riley, The Regulated Investment Company Modernization
Act of 2010, INV. L., May 2011, at 3.
91
Willens, supra note 28, at 603; see The Blackstone Grp. L.P., Amendment No. 9 to Form S-1
Registration Statement (Form S-1/A), at 69 (June 21, 2007) [hereinafter Blackstone S-1 Amendment].
Blackstone’s S-1/A filing intricately describes the Blackstone structure, which is beyond the scope of
this Note.
92
In these cases, there is no need for a § 338 election because the assets themselves are being
acquired, not the stock of the corporation that owns the assets. Willens, supra note 28, at 603. See supra
note 57 for a discussion of the implications of the increased basis. In short, a higher basis leads to a
lower capital gain if the assets are sold.
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from § 197(a)’s amortization deductions for acquired intangibles.93 As in
the § 338(h)(10) transactions, TRAs compel the purchasing subsidiaries to
pay the transferors (entities owned by private equity firms) a percentage of
the subsequent tax savings.94 Furthermore, since the structure is set up as a
partnership, when the pre-IPO owners sell their securities, they will pay tax
at the capital gains rate.95 The PTP, on the other hand, receives the benefit
of amortization deductions on income that would otherwise be taxed at the
higher corporate tax rate.96
The highest profile, and most controversial, supercharged PTP IPO
was The Blackstone Group, L.P.’s (Blackstone) IPO in 2007. As part of the
IPO, Blackstone’s subsidiaries entered into a TRA with the pre-IPO owners
whereby the subsidiaries agreed to pay 85% of the cash savings resulting
from the depreciation and amortization associated with the stepped-up
basis.97 Total payments under the TRA were expected to be $863.7 million,
or between $35.5 million and $77.3 million per year for fifteen years.98 In
fact, the PTP structure was so efficient from a tax perspective that experts
estimated the pre-IPO owners would receive $198 million (in present
value) more in TRA payments from the IPO than they would pay in taxes.99
The U.S. Senate responded to the PTP structure by introducing
legislation that would force companies such as Blackstone and Fortress
Investment Group LLC, the first adopter of the PTP strategy, “to organize
as corporations instead of partnerships for federal tax purposes.”100 In
addition, the House of Representatives proposed legislation that targeted
TRAs specifically.101 The legislation proposed that “if a sale or exchange of
a partnership interest contained a TRA, . . . any gain recognized by the
transferor—stemming not just from the TRA payments but from all income
generated by the partnership interest—would be treated as ordinary
income.”102 Eliminating the different tax treatment for capital gains and

93

Willens, supra note 28, at 603.
Id.
95
Elliott, supra note 1, at 334.
96
Id.
97
Blackstone S-1 Amendment, supra note 91, at 25.
98
Id.
99
David Cay Johnston, Tax Loopholes Sweeten a Deal for Blackstone, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/13/business/13tax.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print [https://perma.cc/
VMS4-ATG2].
100
Ryan J. Donmoyer & Elizabeth Hester, Blackstone, Fortress Tax Structure Targeted by Senate
(Update5), BLOOMBERG (June 15, 2007, 5:27 PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/
document/JJP4XU0D9L35 [https://perma.cc/TJ82-XDFT].
101
H.R. REP. NO. 110-431, at 24 (2007); Elliott, supra note 1, at 334–35.
102
Elliott, supra note 1, at 335; see H.R. REP. NO. 110-431, at 24.
94
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ordinary income in this context would have removed all incentive to pursue
the PTP structure. While none of the proposed legislation became law, tax
treatment of passthrough entities remains a controversial subject.103 Most of
the controversy stems from the notion that PTPs cross a line “between
reasonably lowering their tax burdens and pretending to be something
they’re not to avoid most, if not all, corporate taxes.”104
C.

Up-Cs

The third iteration of supercharged IPOs utilizes an Up-C structure in
combination with a TRA. The Up-C structure allows partnerships to
execute a supercharged IPO even when they cannot satisfy the qualifying
income exception105 necessary for the PTP structure.106 In these
transactions, although the pre-IPO owners do not pay corporate income tax
on their income, the public entity still pays corporate tax on its income,
unlike in PTP structures.107
In an Up-C IPO, a new corporation is formed, which acts as the public
entity.108 The public company (Pubco) uses the money raised in the IPO to
purchase partnership or limited liability company interests in the operating
partnership from the pre-IPO owners.109 The pre-IPO owners may retain
operating partnership interests as well, but are not required to do so.110 If
the pre-IPO owners retain interests, the interests are recapitalized so that
they are equal in value to the shares of Pubco and exchangeable for
Pubco’s stock.111 As part of the transaction, Pubco will make a § 754
election, which gives a purchaser of partnership interests a stepped-up basis
in the partnership assets.112 Consequently, when the pre-IPO owners sell
their interests to Pubco, Pubco will obtain a stepped-up basis in its share of
103

Elliott, supra note 1, at 335.
Donmoyer & Hester, supra note 100 (quoting Senator Charles Grassley of the Senate Finance
Committee).
105
See I.R.C. § 7704 (c)–(d) (2012); supra text accompanying note 89.
106
Elliott, supra note 1, at 335.
107
Id. Compare to PTP structures where the public partnership, subject to satisfying § 7704, pays
corporate-level tax only on its share of the fee/services income. Id. at 334.
108
Paul & Sabbah, supra note 2, at 76. The Up-C is a derivation of an “UPREIT,” or umbrella
partnership real estate trust, a structure popular for public companies that invest in real estate. Elliott,
supra note 1, at 336. The structure allows property owners to be compensated in partnership units of the
real estate investment trust when they sell their property to the real estate investment trust. Hart, supra
note 54, at 6. This minimizes taxes through the use of a nontaxable, like-kind exchange mechanism. Id.
at 8.
109
Paul & Sabbah, supra note 2, at 76.
110
Id.
111
Id.; Elliott, supra note 1, at 336.
112
I.R.C. §§ 754, 743 (2012); Paul & Sabbah, supra note 2, at 76.
104
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the operating partnership’s assets.113 The TRA between Pubco and the preIPO owners will then transfer a percentage of the tax benefits associated
with the stepped-up basis back to the pre-IPO owners.
In April 2015, GoDaddy, Inc. launched its IPO using an Up-C
structure.114 GoDaddy was a party to five TRAs with its pre-IPO private
equity owners.115 The TRAs called for those entities to receive 85% of the
tax savings resulting from the IPO.116 Prior to the IPO, GoDaddy estimated
that total payments due under the TRAs could total up to $1.4 billion,117 one
of the largest estimated TRA payments to date.118 The Up-C structure
remains popular with additional high-profile IPOs.119 Given the evolution
of supercharged IPOs since the original enactment of § 197(a), it is
apparent that the concept is here to stay. In light of the increasing
popularity of transferring tax benefits, Part II will evaluate the policy
behind permitting or restricting the monetization of tax benefits.
II.

THE MONETIZATION OF TAX BENEFITS

The federal government has adopted different stances regarding the
monetization of tax benefits.120 The academic debate has been equally
divided. Some scholars claim that monetizing tax benefits incentivizes
beneficial behavior121 and increases competitive equality.122 Other scholars
argue that tax benefits are inalienable from the taxpayers who earned or

113

Elliott, supra note 1, at 334. The pre-IPO owners will either sell their interests to Pubco for
purposes of the IPO or, after the IPO, exercise a right to exchange operating partnership interests for
Pubco stock. Paul & Sabbah, supra note 2, at 76. The Up-C structure mimics Example 4 in § 1.701-2(d)
of the income tax regulations, which describes a similar structure for REITs. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(d)
(1994).
114
GoDaddy Inc., Amendment No. 7 to Form S-1 Registration Statement (Form S-1/A), at 7 (Mar.
19, 2015) [hereinafter GoDaddy S-1 Amendment]; see also Angela Chen, GoDaddy Posts Upbeat
Guidance as Sales Grow 18%, WALL ST. J. (May 12, 2015, 5:00 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/godaddy-posts-upbeat-guidance-as-sales-grow-18-1431463377
[https://perma.cc/S83S-AQKW] (discussing the GoDaddy IPO).
115
GoDaddy S-1 Amendment, supra note 114, at 13.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 48.
118
This conclusion is based on the author’s review of publicly available registration statements and
TRAs.
119
See, e.g., Shake Shack Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 14 (July 20, 2015).
120
Compare Wallace, supra note 52, at 227, 244–46 (describing the adoption of safe harbor leasing
in 1981, the political backlash that followed, and the subsequent repeal in 1982), with id. at 38–41
(describing the temporary enactment and permanent adoption of the popular tradeable low-income
housing tax credit). See infra Section II.B.1 for a discussion of the failed safe harbor leasing program
and infra Section II.B.3 for a discussion of tradeable low-income housing tax credits.
121
See Wallace, supra note 52, at 238.
122
Warren & Auerbach, supra note 46, at 1772.
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created the benefit,123 and that most systems of monetization would be too
administratively complex.124 This Part will place these debates in context,
outlining examples to clarify the views on both sides. Then, Part III will
utilize this framework to evaluate supercharged IPOs and TRAs and argue
that permitting monetization of tax benefits through the use of TRAs in the
IPO context is beneficial, and reflects many of the positive attributes of
monetization while avoiding many of the negative aspects.
Accordingly, this Part will begin by examining past and present
policies toward the monetization of tax benefits and the theories supporting
various views. Then, it will apply these various theories to different types
of proposed transactions, each of which has received different treatment
under the I.R.C. Finally, by way of example and application, it will discuss
the I.R.C.’s treatment of leasing depreciable property, selling NOLs, and
investing in specific entities that receive tax incentives from the
government. This will lay the foundation for this Note’s ultimate argument
that TRAs in the supercharged IPO context should be viewed favorably in
light of the positive qualities they share with the tax advantages of NOLs
and investable tax credits, while simultaneously avoiding the complications
that doomed the safe harbor leasing program.
A.

Theories and Justifications of the Monetization of Tax Benefits

This Section discusses justifications for and against the monetization
of tax benefits, initially within the context of the Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981 (ERTA), the first federal program explicitly permitting the
monetization of federal tax benefits.125 Initially, the ERTA justified
monetization on the grounds that different companies with different
abilities to use tax benefits should be treated equally from a tax
perspective.126 Today, advocates of monetization argue that monetization
increases risk-taking and investment in the economy.127 Similarly, some
contend monetization permits more efficient allocations of resources.128
Conversely, opponents of monetization argue that monetization leads to tax
avoidance, is poorly understood by the public, costs the federal government
significant amounts of money, and is a poor substitute for other policy
123

Tsilly Dagan & Talia Fisher, Rights for Sale, 96 MINN. L. REV. 90, 93 (2011).
Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits,
59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 73 (2006).
125
See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172; B. Anthony Billings
& Buagu Musazi, Monetize Tax Assets to Improve Bonus Depreciation Incentive, 119 TAX NOTES 299,
299 (2008).
126
Warren & Auerbach, supra note 45, at 1759–60.
127
See, e.g., Billings & Musazi, supra note 125, at 299–300.
128
See, e.g., Dagan & Fisher, supra note 123, at 132.
124
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tools.129 Moreover, scholars point out that tax benefits are inherently
inalienable: they are attached to the taxpayer that earned the benefit.130
When the ERTA131 was enacted, monetization proponents reasoned
that all companies, regardless of profitability, should be treated equally
from a tax perspective; the government, if it was going to cut taxes, should
not favor more profitable enterprises.132 However, equality (or competitive
neutrality) can be evaluated by various measures and is at best an unclear
term. For example, one goal of monetization could be to enable companies
to achieve equal, if not similar, after-tax costs of capital for investments in
the same assets, all else equal.133 Another goal could be to provide all
companies, regardless of profitability, with the same dollar benefits with
respect to the economic depreciation of the associated property.134
Professors Alvin Warren, Jr. and Alan Auerbach demonstrate that the
amount of tax benefits that should be transferable under either of these
goals is not necessarily the same.135 Thus, the idea of competitive
neutrality, while attractive in theory, is difficult to implement through tax
benefit monetization.
While competitive neutrality may be difficult to achieve through tax
policy, there are other advantages to monetization. Monetized tax benefits
more effectively allocate public resources and distribute tax benefits to
those who need them.136 Individuals who wish to take advantage of tax
benefits beyond individual limitations could purchase excess tax benefits
from those unable to capitalize on such benefits.137 In other words,
taxpayers could match their tax benefits to their individual needs.138 More
efficient allocation of resources would increase economic risk-taking by
giving value to unused credits and deductions.139
129

See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982, at 53
(Comm. Print 1983).
130
Dagan & Fisher, supra note 123, at 93; see text accompanying note 139.
131
The ERTA and its safe harbor leasing program are discussed more fully in Section II.B.1.
132
Warren & Auerbach, supra note 46, at 1768.
133
Id. The Joint Committee on Taxation suggests that one reason for making depreciation
deductions transferable was to provide loss companies with the same cost of capital as other firms.
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF SAFE HARBOR LEASING
PROVISIONS UNDER THE ACCELERATED COST RECOVERY SYSTEM 2 (Comm. Print 1981).
134
Warren & Auerbach, supra note 46, at 1769–70.
135
Id. at 1770.
136
Dagan & Fisher, supra note 123, at 132.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
These were among the arguments advanced by the Treasury Department when monetization
was again considered by Congress in 2007. Billings & Musazi, supra note 125, at 299.
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However, because tax benefit monetization is complex and relatively
novel, there are significant problems associated with the implementation of
any such program. Depending on how a monetization scheme is structured,
there may be significant tax avoidance opportunities, a hostile public
reaction to the notion of selling tax benefits, and a large revenue cost to the
federal government.140 These were among the problems associated with the
ERTA, which led to its repeal.141 Furthermore, since tax benefits are
allocated on a taxpayer basis (i.e., tax benefits are given directly to those
taxpayers that qualify, as opposed to a third party), such benefits are widely
considered “inherently personal and inalienable.”142 From the perspective of
an individual taxpayer, this makes sense: deductions and credits are
typically awarded to taxpayers who either earned the tax benefit (e.g., by
donating money or goods to a charity) or have a defined feature that entitles
them to the benefit (e.g., by having a certain number of children).143
However, even though most tax benefits are thought of as inalienable,
scholars acknowledge tax planners frequently find ways to effectively
transfer these benefits.144 Furthermore, there could be significant benefits to
monetizing such tax benefits by making them alienable. After all,
alienability allows tax benefits to flow to those who value them the most.145
Regardless, there is widespread belief that the tax system is not an
instrument of social policy.146 Scholars argue the tax system is a tool for
revenue collection, not a market for government benefits.147 Similarly, the
complexity associated with monitoring a system in which tax benefits are
monetized may be too administratively complex.148 Nevertheless, these
140

STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., supra note 129, at 53.
Id.
142
Dagan & Fisher, supra note 123, at 93. Professor Daniel Shaviro states that “the folk definition
of ‘taxes’ that governs our fiscal language apparently holds that favorable tax attributes, such as credits
and deductions, cannot properly be traded.” SHAVIRO, supra note 47, at 17.
143
Dagan & Fisher, supra note 123, at 125 n.143.
144
Id. Professor Shaviro goes so far as to colorfully describe a tax planner’s job as “finding
pinpricks in the law and driving trucks through them.” SHAVIRO, supra note 47, at 54.
145
Dagan & Fisher, supra note 123, at 132–33.
146
Tracy A. Kaye, Sheltering Social Policy in the Tax Code: The Low-Income Housing Credit,
38 VILL. L. REV. 871, 872–73 (1993).
147
Wallace, supra note 52, at 265. But see Batchelder et al., supra note 124, at 26–29 (confronting
arguments that tax incentives narrow the tax base and complicate the system). Batchelder et al. argue
that refundable tax benefits are the ideal method of creating behavioral incentives in the I.R.C. Id. at
28–29. Refundable tax credits, whereby the government will refund the taxpayer if the value of the
credit exceeds the taxpayer’s tax liability, are another form of monetizing tax benefits. Instead of
creating a market for tax benefits, refundable tax credits give taxpayers money directly so they realize
the full value of the credit.
148
Batchelder et al., supra note 124, at 73. Even if other areas of the government were used to
deliver the same benefits as monetized tax benefits (e.g., providing some form of government subsidy
141
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concerns may be overcome through careful structuring of the monetization
program. Additionally, shifting a government program out of the tax
system into another area of government may only shift the total amount of
bureaucracy and administrative tasks, without actually minimizing burdens.
The following Section will apply these advantages and disadvantages to
specific tax programs, which will then be compared to TRA-enabled
supercharged IPOs.
B.

Application to Current Tax Benefits

The preceding Section discussed the dominant reasoning and theories
supporting and opposing the monetization of tax benefits. This Section will
apply the principles discussed above to several common tax transactions
where the government has taken differing positions regarding the
monetization of the associated tax benefits. Identifying the benefits and
concerns of three different tax transactions will lay the foundation to
demonstrate that supercharged IPOs share the benefits of these transactions
without the downsides. The qualities of tax transactions described in this
Section justify permitting the use of TRAs to supercharge IPOs.
1. “Leasing” Depreciable Property.—“Leasing” depreciable
property for the purpose of monetizing the tax benefits associated with the
depreciation and any other investment tax credits is generally prohibited.149
However, in 1981, Congress enacted the ERTA in an effort to stimulate the
economy.150 The ERTA contained a statutory safe harbor for leasing
transactions and was the first federal program explicitly permitting the
monetization of federal tax benefits.151 The ERTA instituted an investment
tax credit for purchases of certain types of property, generally machinery
and equipment, and increased the rate of depreciation for other forms of
property.152 By implementing a system of statutory depreciation deductions
plus tax credits, the ERTA enabled businesses to recover capital costs
(through a reduction in taxes) for machinery and equipment faster than a
for loss corporations instead of permitting the future deductibility of net operating losses), there is an
argument that administrative hurdles otherwise faced by the IRS will be replaced by the same
administrative headaches at other agencies. Wallace, supra note 52, at 265–66.
149
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX
REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 96 (Comm. Print 1987) (“Essentially, the law is that the economic substance
of a transaction, not its form, determines who is the owner of the property for tax purposes. . . . [L]ease
transactions cannot be used solely for the purpose of transferring tax benefits; they have to have nontax
economic substance.”).
150
Billings & Musazi, supra note 125, at 299.
151
Id.
152
Warren & Auerbach, supra note 46, at 1753. See generally Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172.
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system tied to economic depreciation.153 However, the substantial tax
benefits available under the ERTA were only available to companies with
available income that the benefits could offset.154 This meant that
companies without income, usually startups and more mature companies
operating at a loss (loss companies155), were effectively deprived of the
ERTA tax benefits.156
Startups, which traditionally invest substantially in depreciable
property, generally have no income for the credits and deductions to
offset.157 Loss companies also do not have any income, making them
effectively tax-exempt.158 In comparison, profitable companies, which
invest in the same assets as startups and loss companies, are more likely to
have excess income, enabling them to take advantage of the deductions and
credits.159 Lawmakers wanted startups and loss companies to be able to
realize the same benefits from the program as profitable companies for two
reasons. First, Congress thought the government should avoid favoring
different investors in comparable projects.160 Reduced taxes for some
companies but not others could be economically inefficient if the
companies that can take advantage of the tax benefits are not those “best
able” to use the qualified property.161 Second, a lack of government
neutrality could lead to tax-induced mergers as profitable companies sought
to acquire the unused tax benefits of startups and loss companies.162
To remedy this problem, Congress monetized the ERTA benefits
through safe harbor leasing, which made the benefits transferable from
companies that had no use for them to those that could use them to offset
income.163 In a safe harbor leasing transaction, tax benefits are not directly
bought and sold. Instead, Company A, which seeks to invest in depreciable
153

Warren & Auerbach, supra note 46, at 1753. The new depreciation system was known as the
Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS). ACRS was replaced by the Modified Accelerated Cost
Recovery System (MACRS), still in use today, as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Pub. L. No. 99514, § 201, 100 Stat. 2085.
154
Warren & Auerbach, supra note 46, at 1758.
155
These companies, as defined by Warren and Auerbach, have little to no taxable income, which
means they pay little to no tax. Id. at 1760.
156
Id. at 1758–61.
157
See id. at 1758–59.
158
Id. at 1760.
159
See id. at 1759.
160
Id. at 1760; see STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., supra note 133, at 2
(discussing alternative proposals Congress considered to monetize the ERTA benefits so that they
would not be lost by companies unable to use them).
161
Warren & Auerbach, supra note 45, at 1761.
162
Id. at 1760; see STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., supra note 133, at 2.
163
SHAVIRO, supra note 47, at 17–18.
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property such as a machine, but which cannot take advantage of the
associated tax credits and deductions, will ostensibly sell the machine to
Company B.164 Company B will simultaneously lease the machine back to
Company A. Company B would claim the depreciation deductions and
investment tax credits as the machine’s owner, while Company A would
enjoy the use of the machine.165 While similar sale–leaseback transactions
were already common, the ERTA condoned transactions that “involve[d]
nothing beyond mere paper shuffling, as opposed to being required to meet
some minimum standard of genuine economic effect.”166
Congress repealed the safe harbor leasing rules in 1982.167 Significant
problems arose with the program, including non-payment of taxes, public
outcry at the idea of companies selling tax benefits, lost government
revenue, and the ability to accomplish the same goals through alternative
means.168 Perhaps also important was that the sale–leaseback mechanism
represented a “significant deviation” from the traditional rule in tax policy
that the substance of a transaction, not the form of the transaction,
determines tax liability.169 As this Note will demonstrate, these concerns are
largely absent in the TRA-enabled supercharged IPO context.
Congress considered addressing the monetization of tax assets again
in 2004 and 2007, but monetization was not adopted in any final
legislation.170 In a 2007 Treasury Department report, the Treasury reasoned
that the current tax system discourages risk-taking by “taxing profits but
not refunding the tax effect of losses and unused tax credits.”171 Permitting
firms to monetize tax assets would allow the startup and loss companies
described above to benefit equally with other companies that pay a higher
marginal tax rate.172 This would potentially induce additional capital
investment.173
Since the repeal of the safe harbor laws, the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) has instituted guidelines that determine when a contract is a lease

164

Id. at 18.
See id. (describing this transaction in more detail).
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., supra note 129, at 53.
169
Warren & Auerbach, supra note 46, at 1762; see, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465,
469–70 (1935) (holding that in a corporate reorganization, a taxpayer will be bound by the economic
substance of a transaction, not necessarily the legal form of the transaction).
170
Billings & Musazi, supra note 125, at 299.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 300.
173
Id.
165
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versus a “conditional sales contract.”174 Fundamentally, these rules look at
the “economic substance of a transaction, not its form.”175 Under this
standard, “lease transactions cannot be used solely for the purpose of
transferring tax benefits; they have to have nontax economic substance.”176
In other words, the tax benefits associated with leasing can no longer be
bought and sold absent some other economic justification for the
transaction.
Safe harbor leases were only consistent with the theory that tax law
should be neutral among loss companies and profitable companies in the
most general sense. There were several issues with the safe harbor leasing
program that did not allow it to achieve equality, leading to its abuse and
repeal.
One theory of transferability under a program of competitive
neutrality is to equalize the after-tax costs of capital when investing in the
same assets.177 However, the safe harbor leasing program required that any
safe harbor lease be done on terms prescribed by the Treasury Department,
consistent with a fictional loan used to acquire the property, which did not
necessarily correspond with actual capital costs.178 As a result, the market
terms requirement did not ensure that profitable and loss companies were
treated neutrally through equal after-tax costs of capital.179
A second theory of competitive neutrality is that transferability should
enable different taxpayers to receive equal dollar benefits under the
monetization program.180 However, the down payments in the safe harbor
lease transactions were calculated using a formula that incorporated the
taxes on the lease income the lessor would receive over the length of the

174

Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 39, 41. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 repealed the finance lease
rules which succeeded the safe harbor rules and never became fully effective. Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 201, 100 Stat. 2085. Consequently, the earlier pre-ERTA leasing rules govern
whether a transaction qualifies as a lease for tax purposes. The guidelines used by the IRS to evaluate
leases are summarized in IRS Revenue Ruling 55-540, which states that “[w]hether an agreement,
which in form is a lease, is in substance a conditional sales contract depends upon the intent of the
parties as evidenced by the provisions of the agreement . . . . Each case must be decided in the light of
its particular facts.” Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 39, 41. A conditional sales contract, sometimes
known as a retail installment contract, is an agreement whereby the buyer takes possession of the sold
property while title remains with the seller, subject to installment payments made by the buyer. After
the buyer fully pays for the property, the buyer receives title. Retail Installment Contract, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2011).
175
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., supra note 149, at 96.
176
Id.
177
Warren & Auerbach, supra note 46, at 1768.
178
Id. at 1769.
179
Id.
180
Id. at 1769–70.
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lease, instead of tax reductions the lessor would experience from economic
depreciation that occurred over a shorter period of time.181 This resulted in
larger down payments upon the sale of the property than necessary to
compensate for the sold tax benefits, resulting in an unequal stream of
benefits received by the parties.182
A third theory of competitive neutrality takes for granted the
difference in tax benefits between a lessor and lessee before the enactment
of the monetizing rule.183 Instead, the theory argues companies should only
be able to monetize the incremental benefit of future subsidies.184 However,
even from this perspective, the safe harbor leasing rules failed to eliminate
inequality.185 There was still a considerable mismatch between the down
payments in the leasing transactions and the incremental benefit of the tax
subsidies.186
An additional problem with the safe harbor program, and another
reason why leasing depreciable property without an economic reason is
prohibited, is that under the fiction of leasing, the creditworthiness of the
lessee is an important consideration.187 If a party to one of these
transactions entered bankruptcy, it was unclear how the amounts payable
and receivable under the leasing contract would be treated. For example, if
the lessee entered bankruptcy, would the bankruptcy court unwind the
entire transaction or only discharge the payments made by the lessee?188
A similar problem related to monetized tax benefits generally, and
safe harbor leases specifically, is that the buyer of the tax benefit needs to
ensure that the seller legitimately earned the benefit in the first place.189 In
the case of safe harbor leases, buyers essentially became Treasury
Department stand-ins for audit purposes.190 This necessarily required

181

Id. at 1770. Warren and Auerbach’s calculations on this matter are fairly complex and involve
several assumptions but reach the conclusion that the sellers of the tax benefits receive a larger down
payment upon the lease of the equipment than they otherwise would in a scenario where both parties
benefitted equally from the safe harbor lease rules over time. Id. at 1770–71.
182
Id.
183
Id. at 1771.
184
Id.
185
Id. at 1770.
186
Id. at 1770 & tbl.V.
187
Id. at 1776.
188
Id. at 1776–77. This also raises the question of whether the tax benefits are severed from the
property. Would the lessor continue to receive the full tax benefits of the transaction or would there be
some sort of recapture? See id. at 1776 (questioning whether the transferee of an asset subject to a safe
harbor lease would also receive the remaining tax benefits and how recapture rules would work).
189
Id. at 1777.
190
Id.
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additional transaction protections such as indemnities, adding further
complexities to the transactions.191
The system quickly grew out of control: in 1981 alone, the Treasury
Department estimated that $19.1 billion of equipment had been leased
under the program, with billions of dollars of potential revenue loss for the
government.192 The public turned against the system as the government
realized the full cost of the program and perceived abuses were
publicized.193 Notably, General Electric was able to offset its entire 1981
tax liability through the program even though it had pretax earnings of
$2.66 billion.194 Moreover, it also purchased tax benefits to offset prior
years’ tax payments totaling $90 million.195 In another instance, Occidental
Petroleum Corp. was able to sell tax benefits attributable to almost $95
million of equipment.196 In the face of mounting public criticism and
ballooning federal deficits, the program was phased out.197
2. Selling NOL.—Another analogous tax transaction is the purchase
and sale of NOLs, which may be partially monetized. Since these involve
the transfer of tax benefits from one enterprise to another, subject to a welldefined set of rules, they are comparable to supercharged IPOs. NOLs
occur when a taxpayer has deductions in excess of gross income for a given
tax year, resulting in a net loss for the year.198 Taxpayers are permitted to
carry the loss back to apply to the two preceding years, or carry it forward
up to twenty years.199 In either case, the NOL is allowed as a deduction
from the taxable income for that year.200 Monetization occurs through
§ 381, which permits an acquiring corporation to carry over certain tax
attributes, including NOLs, of the acquired corporation.201
The possibility of monetizing NOLs through acquisitions raises the
specter of “trafficking” in NOLs: corporations engaging in acquisitions for
the sole purpose of acquiring the target’s NOLs. Congress has struggled
with how to respond to the possibility of trafficking, or monetizing,
191

Id. at 1777–78.
Richard J. Bronstein & Alan S. Waldenberg, The Short Life and Lingering Death of Safe
Harbor Leasing, 69 A.B.A. J. 1844, 1846 (1983).
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
I.R.C. § 172(c) (2012). Gross income is “all income from whatever source derived.” Id. § 61(a).
199
Id. § 172(b)(1)(A).
200
Id. § 172(a).
201
Id. § 381(a), (c); see ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 4, at 346–47 (describing the main provisions of
§ 381).
192
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NOLs.202 The carryover provisions were initially enacted to rectify the
limitations of an annual accounting system by performing an “averaging
function” across accounting periods.203 Permitting NOLs to offset unrelated
income of an acquirer does not appear to serve any averaging function.204
Thus, Congress enacted § 382 to remove the incentive for an acquirer to
purchase a target solely for its NOLs.205 Section 382 is triggered if “the
percentage of the stock of a loss corporation owned by one or more 5percent shareholders has increased by more than 50 percentage points over
the lowest percentage owned by each such shareholder during” a period
lasting up to three years.206 Once § 382 is triggered by such an ownership
change, it prohibits the use of target company NOLs as a tax deduction
unless the new corporation either continues the business of the old target
corporation for a two-year period or “uses a significant portion of the old
loss corporation’s assets in [the combined] business.”207
Congress, the courts, and the Treasury Department have advanced
four main rationales to support the notion that NOLs should not be
monetized through ownership changes.208 First, taxpayers should not be
permitted to engage in transactions solely to reduce tax liability.209 These
transactions violate the principle of neutrality, discussed earlier,210 which
holds that tax law should treat all taxpayers similarly: it should neither
stimulate nor inhibit business decisions.211 Absent a legislative goal to
encourage or discourage behavior, tax laws should not interfere with
normal business decisions.212
Second, monetization opponents argue that, consistent with the
principles of inalienability, the tax benefits associated with losses should be
enjoyed by the taxpayer that actually incurred the losses.213 Since the
shareholders of a corporation are ultimately the beneficiaries of the tax
202

ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 4, at 347. See generally Mark Hoenig, Trafficking in Net Operating
Losses: What’s So Bad?, 145 TAX NOTES 919 (2014) (discussing the history of and policy behind NOL
provisions in the I.R.C., from 1918 through the Tax Reform Act of 1986).
203
ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 4, at 347.
204
Id.
205
Id. at 348.
206
Id. at 349 (footnote omitted). This relatively simple formula becomes much more complex
when combined with corporate tax reorganizations and other highly-structured transactions. See id. at
349–51.
207
ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 4, at 351; see I.R.C. § 382(c) (2012).
208
Hoenig, supra note 202, at 931.
209
Id.
210
See discussion of tax neutrality, supra text accompanying notes 177–86.
211
Hoenig, supra note 199, at 931–32.
212
Id. at 932.
213
Id. at 933.
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benefits earned by the corporation, restrictions on ownership changes
ensure that those shareholders who experienced the corporate losses also
share in the gain associated with the tax benefits.214 Third, some maintain
that shareholders would receive inadequate compensation when selling the
NOLs.215 Finally, some contend that tax benefits should only be available to
offset income generated by the same activity from which the losses arose.216
While NOLs are not entirely monetizeable, they provide an important
comparison to the TRA payments in a supercharged IPO. As Part III will
explore, many of the arguments in favor of restricting the transferability of
NOLs justify TRA payments in the supercharged IPO context.
3. Investing in LIHTCs.— In contrast to leasing depreciable property
to take advantage of tax benefits (which is prohibited), or trafficking in
NOLs (which is subject to ownership restrictions and other requirements
discussed above),217 there are several existing tax credit programs designed
to allow tax credits to be sold to third parties. This Section will explore the
justifications for trading in one of these credits, the LIHTC, but there are
other programs that function in similar fashion.218
The LIHTC incentivizes the development of low-income housing by
providing a credit of 70% of the applicable basis of new buildings and 30%
of the applicable basis for other qualified buildings.219 The applicable basis
is the amount invested by the developer in certain depreciable construction

214

Id.
Id. at 934. This argument seems particularly weak since the tax benefits are inherently valuable
and every transaction is different. By restricting the transfer of the NOLs, the I.R.C. makes them even
less valuable, not more valuable. See id. at 935. On the other hand, this could be viewed as a protective
measure for sellers on the assumption that sellers may be smaller and have fewer resources dedicated to
accounting and tax functions. Thus, they may not be in a position to value their tax assets as effectively
as a larger, more sophisticated acquirer.
216
Id. This argument derives from Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, in which the Court disallowed the
use of carryover NOLs in a situation where “the income against which the offset [was] claimed was not
produced by substantially the same businesses which incurred the losses.” 353 U.S. 382, 390 (1957)
(footnote omitted), superseded by statute, Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
217
See supra Section II.B.2.
218
These tradeable tax credits include new markets tax credits (designed to encourage investment
in low-income areas through financing small businesses, working to improve community facilities,
etc.), historic preservation tax credits (designed to rehabilitate designated historic, income-producing
buildings), and several programs related to the production of renewable energy. See New Markets Tax
REVENUE
SERV.,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
TREASURY
1
(2010),
Credit,
INTERNAL
https://www.cdfifund.gov/Documents/atgnmtc.pdf [https://perma.cc/27VH-PXYS]; Tax Incentives for
Preserving Historic Properties, NAT’L PARK SERV., DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
http://www.nps.gov/tps/tax-incentives.htm [https://perma.cc/32EL-WGL4]; see also Wallace, supra
note 52, at 237–47 (discussing examples of tradeable tax credits, including safe harbor leases).
219
I.R.C. § 42 (2012); Wallace, supra note 52, at 238.
215
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costs.220 The credit is generally provided when the building is completed.221
To qualify for the credit, the developer must agree to lease the units to
groups of people that fall into one of two groups designated “lowincome,”222 and the building must be designated as low-income housing for
at least fifteen years.223 Any development eligible for the credit must
usually apply to a state or local agency, with each state receiving a limited
amount of credit from the federal government to disburse every year.224
The I.R.C. specifically monetizes LIHTCs by making them
tradeable.225 The government provides the tax credits to the owner of a
qualified building, and since they survive transfers of ownership, the tax
credit owners can sell their tax credits by selling interests in the property.226
The I.R.C. also provides that the credits may be allocated to partners based
on their “distributive share” or by agreement of the parties.227 Finally,
certain activity rules that limit the ability of partnerships to take advantage
of tax benefits arising from passive activities are waived in the case of
LIHTCs.228 Read together, these provisions allow for a property ownership
structure whereby the developer is a general partner in the limited
partnership that owns the property, with responsibility for the project, and
tax credit investors are limited partners who utilize the tax credits.229
Investors then receive the benefits and are free to sell their share of the
limited partnership, along with the tax benefit, as they please.230
There are at least two strong reasons for permitting freely transferable
tax credits in this type of transaction that that cannot serve as rationales for
safe harbor leasing or acquisitions of NOLs. First, monetizing the tax
credits allows developers to obtain financing upfront by selling the tax
credits to investors, effectively converting what would otherwise be a tax
credit with value spread out over ten years into a single cash payment.231

220

Wallace, supra note 52, at 238.
§ 42(f)(1).
222
Either 20% or more of the residential units must be “rent-restricted and occupied by individuals
whose income is [50%] or less [than the] area median gross income,” or 40% or more of the units must
be “rent-restricted and occupied by individuals whose income is [60%] or less [than the] area median
gross income.” Id. § 42(g)(1).
223
Id. § 42(h)(6)(D).
224
Kaye, supra note 146, at 881–82.
225
See Wallace, supra note 52, at 239 (explaining the relevant I.R.C. provisions in greater detail).
226
§ 42(d)(7).
227
Id. § 704(a)–(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(1)(i) (as amended in 2016).
228
§ 469(i)(6).
229
Wallace, supra note 52, at 239.
230
Id.
231
Id.
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Nonprofits, the traditional builders of low-income housing, cannot
capitalize on the tax credits due to their tax-exempt status.232 By permitting
nonprofit developers to sell the tax credits to for-profit entities with taxable
income, the government enables tax-exempt, nonprofit organizations to use
credits that would otherwise be worthless to them.233 In effect, monetizing
the tax credits enables the government to incentivize actors that would
otherwise be indifferent to tax incentives. Second, the LIHTC program has
a well-defined public policy goal of providing affordable housing.234 Unlike
the safe harbor regime, which instituted a roundabout mechanism to
provide tax benefits to startups and loss companies, the LIHTC is a federal
subsidy.235 Moreover, the beneficiaries of LIHTCs are well defined and
“clearly defensible,” namely, low-income individuals in need of affordable
housing.236
The principal criticism of a system of tradeable tax benefits is that
tradeable tax benefits are inherently complex and the IRS, a revenue
collector, is not the best agency to implement what amounts to a social
policy.237 Furthermore, there are significant costs associated with the
formation and management of the complex partnership structure that
operates within the LIHTC program, and this complexity leads to
enforcement concerns.238 Those critical of LIHTCs argue that policy
initiatives are better administered through programs that can be supervised
by people with relevant expertise.239 For example, the IRS likely has little
development expertise.
Despite these administrative criticisms, policy programs that rely on
tax expertise may actually be better enforced by the IRS.240 For example,
the LIHTC program requires anyone exercising oversight to have the tax
knowledge to determine which expenses are depreciable and qualify toward
232

Id. at 240.
Id. The I.R.C. requires that at least 10% of a state’s annual allocation of tax credits be given to
nonprofit developers. § 42(h)(5)(A)–(B).
234
Thomas W. Giegerich, The Monetization of Business Tax Credits, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 709, 750
(2012).
235
Id.
236
Id. In contrast, Alan Greenspan reportedly referred to safe harbor leasing as the “equivalent of
food stamps for undernourished corporations . . . [which] basically subsidize capital investment in areas
which the market wouldn’t support.” Bronstein & Waldenberg, supra note 192, at 1846. In the case of
safe harbor leases, it was not easy to defend relaxing tax rules for corporations that already had
minimized their federal tax liability.
237
See Wallace, supra note 52, at 263 (arguing that tradeable tax benefits are “too complex to
compete with the technical efficiency of other mechanisms of government intervention”).
238
Id. at 264.
239
Id. at 265.
240
Id. at 266.
233

510

111:483 (2017)

Finding the Pearl

the tax credit.241 The IRS has the expertise and organization necessary to
measure compliance with tax statutes.242 Moreover, the LIHTC
monetization scheme enlists the help of the third-party purchaser (in this
case, the LIHTC investor) to verify that the transaction complies with the
I.R.C.243 This allows the IRS to “outsource” part of the “expertise and labor
necessary for enforcement.”244 The LIHTC and similar programs are the
most apparent, and perhaps common, example of easily monetized tax
benefits. The success of the LIHTC program demonstrates that monetizing
tax benefits can be an efficient and effective tool to achieve policy goals
and encourage investment.
III.

AN ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF SUPERCHARGED IPOS AND TRAS

TRAs share many qualities with NOLs and investable tax credits that
make those benefits good candidates for monetization. Likewise, TRAs
lack many of the complications that doomed the safe harbor leasing
program. This Part will evaluate these qualities and complications to
establish that TRAs should be embraced as novel tools that increase
efficiency in markets and encourage economic activity.
TRAs serve a beneficial purpose by permitting private parties to
compensate each other for the relative value of tax benefits.245 In other
words, in much the same way that the LIHTC permits private investors to
acquire otherwise worthless tax credits from low-income housing
developers, TRAs permit tax benefits to go to the party that values them
more. However, in the case of a supercharged IPO, the tax benefits are
distributed via contractual agreement instead of a partnership structure

241

Id.
However, this simply raises the question of whether certain behavior should be incentivized
through the I.R.C. at all. The IRS may be most adept at enforcing a tax credit, but perhaps a tax credit is
not preferable to some other incentive program in the first place.
243
Wallace, supra note 52, at 267. This verification system is similar to the ERTA, wherein
transaction counterparties effectively audited the other side, but the LIHTC system is more developed,
and unlike with safe harbor leases, standards have developed that allow LIHTC parties to easily
determine compliance. See Insights Report, New Markets Tax Credits: Unlocking Investment Potential,
CMTY. AFFAIRS DEP’T, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY
18, 25 (2013), https://www.occ.gov/topics/community-affairs/publications/insights/insights-newmarkets-tax-credits.pdf [https://perma.cc/73HJ-U58N] (discussing property-level performance
standards that have developed over time to monitor individual properties in the LIHTC program and the
development of “industry standardization and experience” despite the complexity of the program).
244
Wallace, supra note 52, at 266 (“In a tradable tax credit system, the third parties that buy a
tradable credit are incentivized both to undertake ex ante due diligence and ex post oversight.”).
245
See Paul & Sabbah, supra note 2, at 75 (describing how public company valuations are
generally based on earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA), which
disregards the value of tax benefits).
242
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mandated by government rules.246 Public company valuations are generally
based on metrics that disregard tax attributes.247 Moreover, corporate tax
attributes are difficult to accurately value, because “any valuation . . .
rel[ies] on income projections and other assumptions about the
corporation’s ability to use the tax attributes in the future.”248 This suggests
that the tax assets held by public companies are not properly valued by
public company investors, either because they are not well understood by
investors, or because investors care more about recurring income over time
rather than nonuniform items similar to tax benefits, which are difficult to
value and may not be realized evenly across time.249 If public company
investors do not value these assets, then it makes sense the assets should be
able to be transferred to other interested parties that can take advantage of
them.250 The TRA arrangements are similar to the safe harbor leasing
regime in this regard: the party that values the tax benefit more is permitted
to acquire the tax asset.251 However, TRA arrangements are free of the
compliance costs associated with the safe harbor leasing program. First,
TRA payments are made after taxes are calculated,252 minimizing audit
costs on the part of the IRS. Second, unlike the safe harbor leasing program
where the parties to a transaction may have no prior relationship, the parties
to a TRA often have an extensive relationship dating back to the early
stages of the company.253 While similar deal protections may be required,254

246

See Wallace, supra note 52, at 239 (discussing the LIHTC partnership rules); see also supra text
accompanying note 229 (describing the ownership structure used in LIHTC projects).
247
Paul & Sabbah, supra note 2, at 75; Elliott, supra note 1, at 337.
248
Paul & Sabbah, supra note 2, at 75.
249
Id. (discussing the difficulties involved in valuing tax attributes).
250
Interestingly, the legislative history with respect to the transferability of NOL deductions
suggests that Congress agrees companies should not be valued based upon their tax attributes. By
restricting the transferability of NOLs, Congress reduced their value to the NOL owners, implying that
other parts of the company are more valuable. Hoenig, supra note 202, at 928 (“The enunciated goal of
the new rules was to limit use of loss carryovers following an ownership change to the amount of losses
that would have been used by the loss corporation had no ownership change occurred.”); see S. REP.
NO. 99-313, at 232 (1986) (discussing how Congress’s “limitation on earnings” approach limits the use
of NOLs by a taxpayer that did not create the NOL).
251
Warren & Auerbach, supra note 46, at 1768; see also supra text accompanying note 163
(discussing how safe harbor leasing essentially permitted tax benefit transfers from companies that
could not use them—startups and loss companies—to companies that valued them greatly, presumably
those with taxable income).
252
See Paul & Sabbah, supra note 2, at 77 (discussing the typical method TRAs use to calculate
payments).
253
See discussion supra notes 17–18.
254
Warren & Auerbach, supra note 46, at 1776–78; see also supra text accompanying notes 190–
91 (discussing requiring additional indemnities in safe harbor leases).
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the parties are at least familiar with each other and have a history of
working together.
Permitting monetization of tax benefits through TRAs is also likely to
encourage beneficial risk-taking in the economy.255 For example, Congress
sometimes grants tax incentives to spur growth in times of economic
weakness.256 However, absent some form of monetization, loss companies
(those struggling to make a profit) are also those companies that have the
least need for tax incentives.257 Therefore, permitting monetization makes
these incentive programs more efficient by allowing companies most in
need of the incentives the ability to utilize them.258 Enabling pre-IPO
owners to earn a greater return encourages more investors to invest in
private, growing enterprises. Furthermore, before TRAs, private investors
taking a company public had to determine the value of the company at one
moment in time: the moment of the IPO. With TRAs, pre-IPO owners are
no longer forced to estimate the present value of future tax benefits because
they receive the tax benefits as they are recognized.259 If private investors
are better able to value companies when they exit their investments, it is
reasonable to conclude they will be more willing to take additional upfront
risk. Furthermore, if public investors do not value the tax attributes created
in the supercharged IPO, permitting pre-IPO owners to extract that value
over time maximizes values for all parties involved. In fact, if pre-IPO
owners are willing to accept payments over time as the public entity
realizes tax savings, instead of a single upfront payment, it may indicate to
the market a high degree of confidence in the success of the public
company.260
One of the key reasons NOLs are only partially transferable is that
many believe tax benefits should be used by those whose capital produced
the losses resulting in the benefit.261 In much the same way, TRAs transfer
255

Billings & Musazi, supra note 125, at 299; see supra text accompanying note 171.
See Billings & Musazi, supra note 125, at 299–300.
257
Id. at 300 (“[T]here is an expected differential response to the bonus depreciation provisions
between low marginal tax rate firms and high marginal tax rate firms.”).
258
Billings & Musazi, supra note 125, at 299 (reasoning that while “accumulated tax losses can be
carried forward and deducted,” nearly “25 percent to 30 percent of the carryovers expire before they can
be used”).
259
Browning, supra note 3 (describing the cash payments received over time).
260
See generally Alexander Edwards et al., Supercharged IPOs: Rent Extraction or Signal of
Future Firm Performance? (Kelley Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 16-14; Rotman Sch. of Mgmt.,
Working Paper No. 2725531, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2725531 [https://perma.cc/6E9T-QKVP]
(discussing the signaling that may be implicit in pre-IPO owners choosing to receive a contingent
stream of payments over time instead of a single upfront payment).
261
Hoenig, supra note 202, at 932; see supra text accompanying notes 213–14. Recall also that
many tax benefits are inalienable and the large amount of tax benefits alienated from companies that
256
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value to those who suffered the taxable gain that produced the tax benefit in
the first place. In particular, the pre-IPO owners contributed the capital that
enabled the new public company to grow before the IPO.262 TRAs are
simply a mechanism for enabling the taxpayer who should receive the
corresponding tax benefit to monetize that benefit.263 TRAs are unlike safe
harbor leasing in this respect. Under the safe harbor leasing regime, tax
benefits could be transferred between unrelated parties.264 The company
that ultimately obtained the benefit of the depreciation deductions was not
required to have actually used the depreciable property and incurred actual
economic depreciation of the property’s value. While it is true there is no
requirement that the parties to a TRA be somehow related, the complexity
inherent in such a document makes it reasonable to assume that only the
pre-IPO owners would have the knowledge, wherewithal, and opportunity
necessary to enter into such a transaction with an entity about to go public.
Furthermore, it seems likely that the pre-IPO owners would have an
interest in ensuring that outside parties are not permitted to enter the picture
given the potentially large recurring payments involved.
The entire supercharged IPO structure operates within the provisions
of the I.R.C. A corporate taxpayer does not need to have any particular
qualities to take advantage of a TRA other than basis that can be stepped
up. In this way, TRAs are different from safe harbor leases. Safe harbor
leases took advantage of a statutory fiction to complete a transaction solely
for tax purposes.265 TRAs, on the other hand, are done in the context of an
IPO, an economic transaction, and permit additional economic value to be
extracted from that IPO.266 TRAs involve the transfer of after-tax dollars. In
comparison, safe harbor leases involved the complicated transfer of pretax
dollars, which could lead to compliance costs.267 With a TRA, the IRS does
not need to worry about significant enforcement costs. While it is true that
the value of a TRA-enabled supercharged IPO stems from the I.R.C.,

earned the benefits was one of the reasons for the public backlash to the safe harbor leasing program.
See Bronstein & Waldenberg, supra note 192, at 1846; Dagan & Fisher, supra note 123, at 93; see, e.g.,
supra text accompanying notes 194–96.
262
Elliott, supra note 1, at 339. Phillip Gall, a former co-managing principal of Deloitte Tax’s
passthroughs group, stated that “‘If the sellers can get paid for the stepped-up basis, why wouldn’t they
get paid for any tax attribute that they’re delivering?’” Id.
263
Id. at 337.
264
See SHAVIRO, supra note 47, at 18 (noting that the deductions were easily transferable for an
“arm’s-length fee”).
265
Id. at 18; see supra text accompanying note 166.
266
Elliott, supra note 1, at 339.
267
See supra text accompanying notes 252–54 (explaining why TRAs do not entail the same
compliance costs as safe harbor leasing transactions).
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tradeable tax credits such as the LIHTC are also only monetizeable because
of a market created by a statutory scheme.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, any attempt to prohibit TRAs
without fixing larger inconsistencies in the I.R.C. would only lead to
additional tax engineering in the future.268 As the evolution of the
supercharged IPO after the enactment of § 197(a) demonstrates, taxpayers,
particularly those with sophisticated accountants and lawyers, will always
seek new and creative ways to minimize tax payments. Any attempt to
prohibit TRAs today without resolving more fundamental inconsistencies
within the tax system will only be a temporary fix.269 The TRA-enabled
supercharged IPOs of today will only be replaced by new, more
complicated devices tomorrow that can accomplish the same goals.
CONCLUSION
This Note does not pretend to propose a conclusive framework for the
classification of tax assets with respect to their transferability. However, it
does raise awareness of the inconsistent treatment of various transactions
that in some cases are very similar. Ultimately, TRAs minimize
inefficiencies in the I.R.C. and reward those who unlock value from tax
benefits. While the complexity of TRA-enabled supercharged IPOs may
appear ominous at first glance, their tax attributes are more similar to those
of tradeable investment tax credits and partially transferable NOLs than
they are to those of the failed safe harbor leasing program. Moreover, given
the benefits TRAs provide to pre-IPO owners, the public market’s apparent
disregard for the transfer of capital associated with TRA payments, and the
low compliance costs associated with the transactions, their use is likely to
increase in the future. TRAs should be valued as creative devices that
effectively unlock IPO value.
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See Fleischer & Staudt, supra note 11, at 368–69 (arguing that the primary factor keeping
supercharged IPOs from becoming more popular is the entity type of the pre-IPO entity); Paul &
Sabbah, supra note 2, at 79 (maintaining that as supercharged IPOs become more common, TRA
arrangements will become increasing popular in other contexts as well).
269
Two obvious examples are the different tax treatment of labor and capital and the different tax
regimes applied to partnerships and limited liability companies (optional passthrough taxation) and
corporations (entity-level taxation).
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